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
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# CYPRIS: ISTATIO OF SORROWS



When Disraeli acquired Cyprus from Turkey in 1878, the island's Greek Christian majority believed that the traditionally pro-Greek British would grant them Enosis—union—with Greece. But the presence of a Turkish Muslim minority, bitterly opposed to Greek rule, and the demands of British imperial strategy frustrated their hopes. Three quarters of a century later, British ministers insisted in a parliamentary debate that the island could never expect full independence. The Athens government showed its anger by issuing a stamp (above) picturing a page from the official Hansard report insultingly overprinted with an ink blob. Greek Cypriots reacted by launching a savage guerrilla campaign. This led to independence—but also to civil war and continuing strife between the island's two communities.

igh and Low are delighted, except Mr. Gladstone, who is frantic." So wrote Queen Victoria to her Prime Minister and favourite, Benjamin Disraeli, of public reaction to his acquisition of Cyprus - "the key to western Asia" - from the Sultan of Turkey in 1878. By a secret convention, the Sultan leased the island - the third largest in the Mediterranean - to Britain as "a place of arms," a base from which she would help to defend Turkey's Asian provinces against Russian encroachment. Disraeli and the Sultan were alarmed by Russian intervention on behalf of the Christian Bulgars, whose revolt against Turkish overlordship had been suppressed with cruel but effective savagery.

With Russian forces at the gates of Constantinople, Disraeli was concerned to prevent any Russian advance that might threaten the overland route to the British Empire in India. Happily for Disraeli, it proved unnecessary to fight the Russians, and Britain found herself in undisputed possession of a sunny new territory. Disraeli, it seemed, had won a good bargain, though High and Low might have been less delighted had they been able to know of the bloodshed and sorrows that "the rosy realm of Venus" would bring.

Britain was merely the last in a long line of foreign rulers of Cyprus. Its name is similar to the Greek word for copper, though whether the island got this name from, or gave it to, the copper industry which was established there in 2300 B.C. is not known. The first traces of human settlement on Cyprus date from the fourth millennium B.C. Greek colonists began to settle there in about 1400 B.C. and these were followed by Phoenician traders. For a thousand years the island was divided into a number of Greek and Phoenician kingdoms. In 294 B.C. it was taken over, in succession, by the Ptolemies (the Greek Macedonian rulers of Egypt), the Romans, the Byzantines, the Lusignans (a noble house from French Normandy), the Venetians, the Ottoman Turks and, finally, the British.

There was an earlier, short-lived British connection with Cyprus. In 1191 Richard the Lionheart, on his way to a crusade in the Holy Land, seized the island from its

ruling Byzantine prince. Richard married Princess Berengaria, daughter of the King of Navarre, in the Cypriot port of Limassol, where she was crowned Queen of England. Cyprus thus became the only overseas territory to witness an English monarch's wedding and an English coronation. Within less than a year Richard sold Cyprus to the Knights Templars, from whom it passed, in 1194, to Guy de Lusignan, the first of 18 Norman-French rulers of the island.

It was the Lusignans who left the most striking visible testament to their presence: the island's magnificent Crusader castles and Gothic churches. But the island's most important legacy was eight centuries of Byzantine influence, which confirmed the cultural character of most Cypriots as Greek-speaking Christians who considered themselves part of the Hellenistic world. The seeds of another culture were implanted in 1571 when the Ottoman Turks ousted the Venetians from Cyprus and gained control of what had become the last Christian outpost in the Muslim East. The Turkish sultans were content to leave Cyprus largely to its own devices, and, like other Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Cypriots were given a considerable degree of autonomy under their archbishop. Nevertheless, Ottoman rule brought an influx of Turkish Muslims into the island from the Turkish mainland, only 40 miles away, an influx which laid the foundations of Cyprus's continuing conflict between a Greek Christian majority and a Turkish Muslim minority.

For two and a half centuries, Cyprus remained a neglected though peaceful corner of the Ottoman Empire. But, in 1821, the mainland Greeks rose against their Turkish overlords. The Greeks also embraced the "Megali Idea" or "Great Idea" of Hellenism. This involved the liberation of all Greeks everywhere and, ultimately, the recovery of Constantinople as the capital of a reunified and resurgent Byzantine Empire.

George Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, co-operated with other European powers in the 1820s to support the struggle for Greek independence (in 1827 the Turkish fleet was destroyed at Navarino by the British fleet under Admiral Sir Edward Codrington). But

after Greece won its independence in 1830, British policy towards Turkey became clouded, for its objectives were to support self-determination for peoples under Turkish rule and, at the same time, to shore up Turkey's position as a bulwark against a possible Russian advance into Asia Minor.

Despite the fact that it was the second of these considerations which led Disraeli to prise Cyprus from Turkey in 1878, the British arrival in the island was welcomed by Greek Cypriots. The Cypriot majority had been moved by the "Megali Idea" and they believed the freedom-loving British would allow them Enosis - union - with mainland Greece. They were soon to discover their mistake. On July 8, 1878, Britain's 82-year rule of the island began when an advance naval guard under Vice-Admiral Sir John Hay landed at Larnaca, a port on the southern coast. It was followed by 400 Indian troops from Malta and by the new British High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley. Wolseley was welcomed by the Bishop of Citium, who expressed the hope that Cyprus would soon be reunited with "Mother Greece." Ninety-five years later, General Grivas and his supporters are still battling to achieve that ideal.

Greek Cypriots were given fresh hope of achieving reunion when Disraeli's Conservative government was heavily defeated at the elections of 1880 and Gladstone, after a torrent of anti-imperial speeches, was returned to power at the head of a large Liberal majority. Gladstone had already described the agreement with Turkey as "an act of duplicity not surpassed, and rarely equalled, in the history of nations," and he believed, like other critics, that lack of good harbours made Cyprus worthless as a military base. Yet Gladstone did not repudiate the agreement with Turkey, even when his occupation of Egypt in 1882 gave Britain control of Alexandria, a base superior to anything Cyprus could offer.

The occupation of Egypt, undertaken to safeguard British influence in the face of a nationalist revolt, proved, indeed, to be a singular misfortune for Cyprus. It gave new scope and durability to the British presence in the Middle East and made Britain increasingly reluctant

to give up any of her possessions in the area. But control of Egypt diminished the importance of Cyprus, and the island became a neglected backwater, later to earn the sobriquet, Britain's "Cinderella colony." Since Britain held the island on lease from Turkey, and was not certain how long she wanted to retain it, there was little incentive for the government or

private capital to invest there.

British occupation of Cyprus brought the Greek Cypriots freedom from Turkish rule, which they might never otherwise have been able to achieve, even with the help of Greece. It also brought them greater security and personal liberty. None of these benefits, however, could offset the three main grievances of the Greek Cypriots under British rule. The first was that, under the terms of the secret convention, an annual tribute, fixed at £92,799, was paid to Turkey for the lease of the island. Not only were the islanders themselves called upon to furnish the money, but it did not even go to the Sultan; it went, instead, to the British Exchequer to help pay off the Ottoman debt to Britain incurred during the Crimean War. The second grievance was that Britain refused to grant the island a representative assembly. A legislative council of 12 elected members (nine Greeks and three Turks) and six members appointed by the High Commissioner, was set up in 1882. But the High Commissioner had a casting vote, which he used to block every Greek demand for self-determination or representative government. Above all, Greek Cypriots were aggrieved by British reaction to their demand for Enosis.

The British reply to all such demands – and to all Turkish Cypriot demands for union with Turkey-remained unvarying: no change could be contemplated in the status of the island. To Greek Cypriot demands for greater self-government, the British reply also remained the same: power could not be placed in the hands of the Greek majority because the interests of the Turkish minority must be safeguarded. Thus, although Cyprus was not formally declared a Crown colony until 1925, it was administered as such from 1880 onwards. But with one vital difference: unlike other colonies, most of them less developed, Cyprus was barred

from aspiring towards eventual self-government and independence.

The demands for Enosis and the conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus were intensified by the expanding struggle between Greeks and Turks outside the island. Crete's attempt to throw off Turkish rule and join Greece brought hundreds of volunteers from Cyprus. The Balkan wars and settlements of 1912–13 raised and then dashed Greek Cypriot hopes of Enosis.

The outbreak of the First World War seemed to many Greek Cypriots to provide a grand opportunity for the realization of their ideal. Cyprus was formally annexed by Britain on November 5, 1914, the same day on which Britain declared war on Turkey. A year later Britain tried to tempt Greece into repudiating her neutrality and joining the Allies by dangling the bait of Cyprus. But Greece refused the bait and when she was finally drawn into the war on the side of the Allies in June, 1917, there was no longer

any need for an inducement.

Greek Cypriots were optimistic, however, that at the post-war peace conference their island would be given the right of national self-determination. But a Greek Cypriot delegation lobbied at Versailles for Enosis in vain. For both the Greek and British governments the question of Cyprus's future was overshadowed by the titantic struggle developing in Asia Minor between Greek Hellenists, led by the Greek Prime Minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, and supported by the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, and renascent Turkish nationalists under Kemal Ataturk. The Greeks were routed and the crisis was resolved in July, 1923, by the Treaty of Lausanne. There was a vast exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. Most important from Cyprus's point of view, the treaty included Turkish recognition of Britain's sovereignty over the island.

The signatories to the Lausanne Treaty wrote an end to both the Ottoman Empire and the pan-Hellenic dream. But they also left Cyprus as the last unsettled territorial issue in the centuries-old struggle between Greeks and Turks.

In 1925 Britain made Cyprus a Crown colony, clearly demonstrating that the future of the island was entirely in her

hands. The results of British rule were by no means discreditable. The large increase in the budget for justice led, for example, to a decline in cases of personal violence. Sanitation was vastly improved. Locusts, a recurring local menace, were brought under control. By 1949 malaria had been extinguished and leprosy was almost wiped out, so that the island enjoyed one of the lowest mortality rates in the world. The island also derived great benefits from an administrative system that operated efficiently without destroying local cultural traditions.

It was, therefore, difficult for the British to understand why the Greek Cypriots should wish to exchange their easy freedoms under an uncorrupt British administration for the dubious privileges of military service, high taxes and inefficient administration under the Athens government 500 miles away. But nationalist sentiment cannot be measured by such things. "The Greekness of the Cypriots," commented Sir Ronald Storrs, the island's Governor from 1926 to 1932, "is, in my opinion, indisputable. . . . A man is of the race which he passionately feels himself to be." During the British occupation Greek Cypriots felt themselves to be under tutelage to an anonymous body of lawgivers hidden in Government House.

Lawrence Durrell, who served from 1954 to 1956 as director of public relations for the Cyprus government, has written that the island had "a strange flavour of stagnation, though the administration was just and conceived with conscience and regard." Greek Cypriots repeatedly pointed out that to be in favour of Enosis was not to be anti-British. The British in Cyprus were not despised. But British Cyprus was a cultural impossibility in a Mediterranean context, and, in Durrell's words, produced in the Greek Cypriots "a feeling of foreignness, of alienation from themselves."

Britain's rejection of Enosis just after the First World War was followed by a Greek Cypriot boycott of elections for the legislative council and local authorities in the island. In 1931 Greek Cypriot frustration erupted in violence. After the elections of that year – which the Greek Cypriots did contest – the Enotists strengthened their position on the legisla-


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# IN PORTAGE

When the British flag was raised at Nicosia in July, 1878, the Greek Cypriot spectators shouted "Long Live Queen Victoria." The explanation of that enthusiasm – according to the *Illustrated London News* (where the engravings on these pages appeared) – was that the impoverished Cypriots hoped to make material profit from the British establishments on the island. For Britain, commented the *I.L.N.* in blissful ignorance of the island's sectarian passions, the occupation

would surely provide moral and social rewards: it could "hardly fail to be an almost unqualified blessing to the inhabitants of Cyprus itself"; and the British officials in Cyprus could look forward to the day when the island would be "looked upon as a favourite quarter," since Game Laws were "to be instituted at once."

Vice-Admiral Sir John Hay supervises the hoisting of the British flag in Nicosia (left), a ceremony at which a Greek provoked a Turkish officer and fled when the latter drew his sword – an ill omen.



Sir Garnet Wolseley, Britain's first High Commissioner in Cyprus, receives loyal greetings from leaders of the island's Turkish community.



Priests bless the Union Jack at Nicosia in a symbolic expression of the Greek Cypriots' hope that the British came bearing the gift of freedom.

tive coucil and Nicodemus, the Bishop of Citium, issued an uncompromising Enotist manifesto urging that no obedience was due to the laws of a foreign ruler. Three days later Nicodemus made a speech inciting Cypriots to break the laws. The following evening - October 21 rioting started in Nicosia. Dionysios Kykkotis, a chief priest, kissed the Greek flag, declared Enosis, and led the rioters to Government House, where they smashed windows and then threw in combustible materials, burning the building to the ground. (It was a wooden prefabricated bungalow brought to the island long before from Ceylon, and seemed to symbolize the temporary and cheese-paring character of the British administration in Cyprus.)

The rioting was halted with the arrival of two Royal Navy ships and the landing of troops from Egypt. The Governor, Sir Ronald Storrs, then deported ten ringleaders without warning, including Nicodemus and the Bishop of Kyrenia and two elected members of the legislative council. Six Cypriots had been killed and 30 wounded. The repression which followed was disproportionately severe. Two thousand islanders were imprisoned, the Greek Cypriots had to pay £66,000 for property destroyed in the main towns and 70 villages, the constitution was suspended, political parties were outlawed, the Press was censored, and the

Governor ruled by decree.

It was under this authoritarian rule that Cyprus entered the Second World War. This demonstrated, as the First World War had done, the island's limited importance as a military base compared with those available to Britain on the Middle East mainland. The German drive to the Levant through Greece and Crete was checked before it seriously threatened Cyprus, though the island provided a base for Allied commando raids on German- and Italian-occupied islands in the region, and 30,000 Cypriots served bravely in the British forces. The war also brought an economic boom to Cyprus, and Britain's alliance with Greece, while Turkey stayed neutral, improved relations between British officials and Greek Cypriots.

In 1941 the ban on political parties in the island was lifted and Greek Cypriots



This house in the Troodos Mountains was the summer home of the British High Commissioner.

organized themselves in two groupings: the Communist-controlled A. K. E. L. (Reform Party of the Working People) and the K.E.K. (Cypriot National party), a Right-wing party in favour of Enosis. The Turkish minority was represented chiefly by the Turkish National Party. Despite the fact that A.K.E.L. was often hostile to Enosis, it gained strength from its links with the island's trade union federation, and at the 1943 municipal elections it won control of two of the five main Limassol and Famagusta. A.K.E.L's success reflected the subdued demand for Enosis during the war. But when the war ended, interest in union with Greece quickly revived.

Many Greek Cypriots believed that their own and Greece's wartime record and Allied declarations, such as the Atlantic Charter of 1941, in favour of national self-determination, would compel Britain to give her blessing to Enosis. But similar hopes had been dashed in 1918, and a Greek Cypriot deputation which went to London in 1946 to press the familiar demand received the familiar reply. The reaction of the new Labour government was, no doubt, largely due to the civil war between Communists and anti-Communists in Greece from 1944 to 1949 and the parallel development of the Cold War between Russia and the West. Britain, backed by the United States, attached much more importance to her military presence in the Middle East and to the need to placate Turkey.

The British government, while reaffirming that there could be no change in Cyprus's status as a Crown colony, did, however, offer some concessions to the Greek Cypriots. The leaders who had been exiled in 1931 were allowed to re-

turn to the island and in 1948 the new Governor, Lord Winster, presented fresh constitutional proposals. These envisaged an elected legislature in which the Greek Cypriots could win an effective majority. This body would have had limited responsibility for internal affairs, but would not have been permitted to discuss Enosis. The proposals pleased no one: they were rejected by the Communists because they failed to provide for full self-government and spurned by the nationalists because they brought Enosis no nearer.

The failure of the 1948 proposals led to a new and much grimmer phase in British-Cypriot relations and the 1950s were to be a decade of intense and bitter political conflict in Cyprus. Ironically, the Greek Cypriot struggle against the British began to gather momentum at a time when Britain was ending her predominant role elsewhere in the region. Economically weakened by the Second World War, she was no longer able to sustain extensive overseas commitments and her withdrawal from India in 1947 removed an essential reason for her control of communications in the Middle East and one of the chief instruments for doing so, the Indian Army. Britain was also forced in 1947 to relinquish her role as protector of Greece and Turkey to the United States.

There were still reasons, however, for British governments to persuade themselves that they ought to hold on to Cyprus. Turkey emerged as a bastion of the Western Alliance, eventually providing the vital link between the N.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O. groupings, and there was a determination not to offend her by handing Cyprus over to the Greeks. The British were also anxious to preserve

Middle East oil supplies and to fend off Soviet military or political penetration. But the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 left Cyprus as the only territory in the eastern Mediterranean under British sovereignty. Elsewhere-in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan – the British military presence depended upon treaties which were the object of increasing nationalist resentment. It was to take a further ten years - and cost much blood - before Britain could bring herself to admit that maintaining sovereignty over Cyprus was simply not worth the price.

Two men - a cleric and an army colonel - forged the instrument of Britain's defeat. The cleric - Archbishop Makarios III of Cyprus - was born Michael Mouskos in 1913. The son of a poor shepherd, he came from the tiny inland village of Pano Panayia and was almost 18 before he travelled as far as the coast. After leaving elementary school in 1926, he entered the Kyyko monastery, the largest and most famous in Cyprus, as a novice priest. Ordained as a deacon in 1938, he was sent to the University of Athens, graduating from the faculty of theology four years later.

After ordination as a priest in 1946, he won one of ten scholarships offered by the World Council of Churches and left Cyprus for the Methodist Theological College at the University of Boston. It was then that he began to earn his reputa-

tion as an ardent advocate of Enosis. He also met rich American Greeks who were later to help finance his campaigns in Cyprus. In 1950, partly on the strength of his Enotist zeal, he was elected Archbishop of Cyprus by representatives of 97 per cent of the Greek Cypriot community. At the age of 37 he was Makarios III, spiritual leader of his people and the most important figure in a country where religious leadership and political power went hand in hand.

The army colonel - George Grivas - 15 years older than Makarios, was born in 1898 at Trikomo. At the age of 18 he enrolled in the Greek Military Academy in Athens and saw his first action with the Greek expedition to Anatolia in 1920. When Italy invaded Greece in 1940, he became chief of staff to the 2nd Athens Division and was eventually promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel for his services on the Albanian front. In 1943 he organized an extreme Right-wing monarchist resistance movement, known simply as "X", against the Axis occupation. During the Greek civil war of 1944-49, he led his movement against the Communists and on one occasion had to be evacuated by the British when Communist forces threatened to overrun his headquarters.

By the late 1940s, Grivas's thoughts were turning to Cyprus. A fanatical Enotist and Greek nationalist, he was already laying plans for a guerrilla cam-


paign to drive the British out of the island. In July, 1951, he and Makarios met for the first time, in Cyprus, and discussed the best means of promoting the cause of Enosis. At first, Makarios was wary of committing himself to armed action, but by early 1952 he had agreed to become chairman of a revolutionary committee established by Grivas in Athens. Makarios's decision may have been influenced by the intransigent line taken by the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, at a meeting with the Greek Foreign Under-Secretary, Evangelos Averoff, in November, 1951.

Averoff offered Britain bases in both Cyprus and Greece in return for Enosis, but Eden's peremptory reply was that the British Empire was not for sale and that the Cyprus question did not exist. In 1952 and 1953, while Makarios travelled to Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon, the United States, France and Germany to gain diplomatic support for Enosis, Grivas planned the military aspect of the campaign. By February, 1953, Grivas's plans were ready, but he was not sure if support would be forthcoming from the Greek government, led now by Field-Marshal Alexander Papagos, hero of the wars against the Axis and the Communists. At first, Papagos firmly discouraged an Enotist rebellion, preferring to rely on diplomatic persuasion. But when he tried to raise the subject with Eden during the latter's visit to Athens in 1953 on a convalescent cruise, he was rudely rebuffed. Eden said Britain would never give Cyprus up and refused to discus the matter any further.

A year later the British attitude was uncompromisingly restated by govern-



Turkish Cypriots display their enthusiasm for the British connection by bearing portraits of the Queen at a ceremony held on the island to mark her coronation in 1953.



DEYTERA 1.6.53

ment spokesmen in the House of Commons. On July 28, 1954, Eden announced that, under pressure from the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Britain had agreed to evacuate the Suez Canal base and would be transferring her Middle East military headquarters to Cyprus. Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State for the Colonies, added that there were "certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent." Rebuffed by Britain and pressured by Grivas, the Greek government now decided to take the matter to the United Nations. At the autumn session of 1954, Greece introduced a resolution calling for self-determination for Cyprus. (It was at Makarios's suggestion that the resolution contained no reference to Enosis.)

The British case was stated by Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State at the Foreign Office. Cyprus, he said, was needed by Britain to fulfil her treaty obligations to Arab states, to N.A.T.O. and to the United Nations. "There is no acceptable alternative in the circumstances to sovereignty. Full administrative control is necessary because leases expire, treaties have a habit of being whittled away and . . . Greek governments, like other governments, change." The British government, under pressure from its own Conservative backbenchers, was afraid that concessions over Cyprus would be seen as a sign of weakness by Arab countries and would offend Turkey. Turkey's concern, however, was more for her own security than for the Turkish community in Cyprus. She feared that if Cyprus joined Greece and a Communist government took over in Athens, the island might be used as a springboard against her by a Russo-Greek alliance.

Eventually, Greece's U.N. resolution was shelved - and Greek Cypriot frustration erupted once more into violence. A general strike was proclaimed and the worst riots since 1931 flared up. It now remained only for Grivas to launch his campaign. In November, 1954, Grivas arrived secretly in Cyprus and in January, 1955, he met Makarios at Larnaca and heard from the Archbishop that the Athens government was now in full sympathy with their aims and had estabArchbishop Makarios (below), called a "bloody-hearted hairy monkey" by

lished a permanent liaison with their organization.

This was the moment Grivas had been waiting for. He called his movement E.O.K.A. - the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters – and in the early hours of April 1, 1955, the guerrilla war began. Bomb attacks all over the island wrecked government offices, police stations and military installations, and the radio transmitter in Nicosia was blown up. E.O.K.A. announced its existence in pamphlets signed "Dighenis," the name of a legendary Greek Cypriot hero which Grivas took as a pseudonym. The attacks persuaded Eden, now Prime Minister, to back down from his original position that the Cyprus question did not exist and he invited both Greece and Turkey to the conference table. Talks between the three sides began on August 29, 1955.

Eden encouraged the Turks to adopt a strong line so that Britain could appear as the moderate arbiter between the two sides. The Turkish government took the hint. Not only did it lay claim to Cyprus in the event of a British withdrawal, but it also whipped up anti-Greek riots in Izmir and Istanbul. On the day of the riots Harold Macmillan, Eden's successor as Foreign Secretary, offered to give Cyprus a new constitution. This would have meant greater powers of self-government, but held out no prospect

became Bishop of Citium and grew a beard, enhancing his dignified aura - and continuing the tradition of most priests of the orthodox church.

one British newspaper in 1964, was

in the 1940s the clean-cut student,

Michael Mouskos (left). In 1947 he



George Grivas, mastermind of the anti-British guerrilla campaign of the 1950s, discusses strategy with terrorist colleagues at one of many planning sessions between 1953 and 1956.

of a change in the island's international status. The riots, however, ended the conference and Makarios rejected the British offer, calling on Cypriots to mount a campaign of passive resistance. The campaign of armed resistance also resumed with a new wave of bomb attacks throughout the island.

The British government was now facing what amounted virtually to a national rebellion. It decided that tough measures were called for. At the end of September, 1955, Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, former Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was appointed Governor of Cyprus and given extra troops and police. A state of emergency was declared, providing for detention without trial and the death penalty for unauthorized possession of arms and explosives.

Although Harding pursued a tough policy against E.O.K.A., he also opened negotiations with Makarios, hoping to reach agreement on a wide measure of self-government while leaving options open on the question of Enosis. Makarios was willing to accept a period of self-government, with Britain in charge of defence and foreign affairs, provided eventual Enosis were not ruled out. In January, 1956, Harding offered a concession on this point in the form of a double negative. In a letter to Makarios he said that it was not British policy that

the principle of self-determination should never be applied to Cyprus. For the first time, there seemed to be the prospect of a peaceful settlement and on February 29, 1956, the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, flew to Cyprus for direct talks with Makarios. But after only one meeting the talks collapsed and 12 days later Makarios, together with the Bishop of Kyrenia and two leaders of E.O.K.A., was arrested and deported to the Seychelles in the Indian ocean.


What is the explanation for this sensational transformation? Certainly, the gap between Lennox-Boyd and Makarios remained wide. First, Makarios insisted that an amnesty should be extended to cover active members of E.O.K.A. as well as those found to be in illegal possession of arms or explosives. Secondly, he insisted that the Greek-Cypriot majority must be given control of the island's affairs. Third, and most important, he demanded that self-government must include control of internal security. But, although Lennox-Boyd rejected all these demands, there appear to have been other motives behind the sudden collapse of his talks with Makarios and the Archbishop's arrest and deportation just over a week later.

The official explanation was that Makarios had close links with E.O.K.A. and did not really want a compromise agree-

ment. But it is inconceivable that the British authorities only learned of these links a few days after Lennox-Boyd's visit and unlikely that they could have believed talks were not worth pursuing because agreement was not reached in one session. The likeliest explanation is that Eden deliberately sought a showdown with Makarios in order to ease the pressure from those Conservatives who were alarmed by Britain's waning power and influence in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact, a defensive alliance signed by Turkey and Iraq in 1955 and joined by Britain, was under attack by President Nasser, and in March, 1956, General Sir John Glubb, British commander of the Arab Legion, was sacked by Jordan's King Hussein. Makarios was an easier target for a prestige-restoring venture than either Nasser or Hussein.

The Archbishop's deportation was, in fact, the prelude to a much tougher British policy in Cyprus and the Middle East generally, culminating in the Suez crisis and the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt eight months later. The battle with E.O.K.A. intensified, reaching its peak in October and November, 1956, when Britain used Cyprus as a base for the Suez war. In November, there were 416 acts of E.O.K.A. violence and 693 Cypriots were detained. This period also saw the first outbreak of fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and, with secret help from Ankara, the Turkish Cypriots formed their own underground organization, Volkan, which took reprisals against the Greek community.

At the end of 1956 Britain made another futile attempt at a settlement. Constitutional proposals, drawn up by Lord Radcliffe, an eminent British judge, offered the Greek Cypriots more power than ever before, but made no mention of self-determination and were promptly rejected by them. The Turkish Cypriots, however, accepted them. In explaining the Radcliffe proposals to the House of Commons, Lennox-Boyd made the first public reference to partition of Cyprus, which, he said, would be the inevitable outcome of self-determination, since the Turkish Cypriots would vote to join Turkey. The Turkish government now adopted partition, or separate selfdetermination, as its official policy \$



In March, 1959, Greek Cypriots celebrated their island's independence and hailed as national heroes Archbishop Makarios and Colonel George Grivas (right). For the first time in history - and after almost four years of guerrilla warfare - the island was free of foreign domination. The struggle had begun in 1955, when, after decades of appeals, petitions and delegations to London, Greek Cypriots lost patience and turned to the pistol and the bomb. On April I Cyprus's main towns were rocked by explosions and leaflets appeared throughout the island calling on patriots to fight for their independence: "Right and justice are on our side. We shall emerge victorious.... Foward together for the liberty of Cyprus."









From the beginning of 1955 to the end of 1959, the British in Cyprus fought against a master of guerrilla warfare — Colonel George Grivas. His E.O.K.A. organization had only 300 full-time activists, but they were superbly drilled in the arts of sabotage, ambush and execution. Against them, the British forces — 37,000 at their peak — were, as Grivas said, like elephants chasing monkeys.


The British used heavy armoured cars, kept to the roads and avoided moving by night. Grivas's men were always on the move, depending on speed, secrecy and surprise. But the Colonel's greatest asset was the allegiance of his people. This grew stronger as a result of tough security measures, for although they cut down terrorism, they aroused Greek Cypriot resentment. "We all," said the Mayor of Nicosia, "belong to E.O.K.A."




A sergeant of the Royal Military Police gives a British civilian target practice in November, 1958, after the murder of four civilians in a week by E.O.K.A. led the government to offer arms to any civilian who could use them properly.

A guard stands sentry at the Army shop in Nicosia as service wives and their children, the shopping done for the day, clamber into a military truck to be driven home.













### II. The British Pull Out

he year 1957 saw a'lull in the dispute. The new British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who had replaced Eden after the Suez fiasco, was eager to salvage something from the wreckage of British power and prestige in the Middle East and was prepared to be conciliatory. His chance soon came. In February, 1957, the United Nations Political Committee expressed its hope that negotiations over Cyprus would soon be resumed and in March E.O.K.A., weakened by the capture of most of its mountain guerrilla fighters, offered a truce if Makarios were allowed to leave the Seychelles. At the end of March Makarios was freed, although he was barred from returning to Cyprus and went to Athens.

Britain, however, was unable to find a basis for reopening talks with Greece and Turkey, and in October E.O.K.A. called off its truce. In December, 1957, Harding was replaced as Governor by Sir Hugh Foot (now Lord Caradon), previously Governor of Jamaica and Colonial Secretary for Cyprus from 1943 to 1945. A man of liberal reputation, he told Charles Foley, the editor of the Times of Cyprus, shortly after his arrival in the island, that it was "a cardinal point of my faith that any people has the right to elect its own leaders" and that nothing was "more obnoxious to my temperament than prisons, detention camps, and the whole paraphernalia of repression." But he added that he would need a period without violence if he were to find a solution.

When Foot arrived in Cyprus there was already talk of a new approach to the island's future, of a solution through independence, not Enosis. Within a month he was able to propose a peace formula to the British government: colonial selfgovernment for from five to seven years, during which time tempers might cool, followed by self-determination, with a Turkish Cypriot veto on Enosis. But Turkish Cypriot fears and growing difficulties at home were causing the Turkish government, led by Adnan Menderes, to become more intransigent. When Foot and the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, arrived in Ankara for talks in late January, 1958, they were told that Turkey would accept nothing less than partition. As if to underline the point, Turkish Cypriots rioted in Nicosia while the British representatives were still in the Turkish capital.

Talks in Athens were no more fruitful and Foot was concerned about possible Turkish reaction when he found that the Greeks had alerted newspapermen to a brief and supposedly confidential meeting he had held with Makarios in the Archbishop's Athens hotel. "So after scarcely more than two months in Cyprus, London, Ankara and Athens," he has written, "we were much worse off than when I first arrived. My proposals had utterly failed. The Turkish riots had put out new danger signals. E.O.K.A. was reorganized and embarked on a new campaign of sabotage and assassination." Foot's fears were fully justified: 1958 helater described as "the terrible year.

Communal rioting, beginning in June, resulted in a two-months' campaign of murder on both sides in which 56 Greek and 53 Turkish Cypriots died, despite the fact that British troops, now numbering 20,000, worked round the clock to protect both sides. In the middle of these troubles came Macmillan's new plan, which he optimistically called an "adventure in partnership." Its main features were the introduction of separate political institutions for the Greek and Turkish communities and the inclusion of representatives of Greece and Turkey on the island's governing council and as advisers to the governor on foreign affairs, defence and internal security. There was to be no change in Cyprus's international status for seven years. The plan suited the Turks well enough, since it would have given Ankara a voice in the government of Cyprus, laid the foundations of partition, and set a bar to Enosis. But it was, of course, rejected by both Makarios and the Greek government.

At the beginning of August, 1958, E.O.K.A. had declared a truce in response to an appeal by the Greek Prime Minister, who was holding talks with Macmillan. Before the end of the month it was called off and Greek Cypriots were urged to boycott the British administration and all Commonwealth goods. Everything British was banned from the shops—chocolate, cigarettes, clothing, the sales of which

dropped by 80 per cent in a week. Greek Cypriots proclaimed their patriotism by appearing in grey, prison-like clothing made from home weaves. And Grivas's asceticism showed itself in a ban on gambling. From a more practical point of view, the ban also meant that British Intelligence was no longer able to offer bribes to those in the habit of losing money at cards or dice. In addition, anyone who meddled with village girls was threatened with execution and one youth, indeed, was shot. Such sternly puritanical edicts were characteristic of a man who, in a country not given to temperance in diet, had trained himself to live on two dozen oranges a day.

More violence inevitably followed E.O.K.A.'s resumption of operations at the end of August, deepening the bitterness between the British and the Greek Cypriots. This reached a peak on October 3. On that date Mrs. Catherine Cutliffe, the wife of a British Army sergeant, was murdered in Famagusta. E.O.K.A. denied reponsibility for the crime, but British troops took their own reprisals. They poured into Famagusta, overturning barrows, smashing windows, and dragging men from their houses. Over 2,000 suspects were rounded up, many of whom were beaten. There seemed no end to the bloodshed or to the constitutional deadlock. "There were many days in that hot summer and autumn of 1958," Hugh Foot has written, "when there seemed no hope at all.'

But suddenly, in December, the fighting stopped. On Christmas Eve Grivas announced a complete cessation of E.O.K.A. activities on the understanding that British military operations also ceased. Two months later an agreement establishing the independence of Cyprus was signed in London by Greece, Turkey and Britain and by representatives of the island's two communities. Several factors operated to bring about such a sudden and spectacular end to the dispute. At the international level, Russia, recently armed with intercontinental nuclear missiles, was mounting a new challenge to the West over access rights to Berlin, and the United States, eager to strengthen N.A.T.O. by bringing Greece and Turkey closer together, threw more weight behind efforts to solve the Cyprus question.

At the local level, the Greek Cypriots were suffering considerable hardship from the British counter-measures against E.O.K.A. and Makarios was becoming increasingly afraid that partition would either be imposed by Britain or won by the Turks in a civil war if the British chose to leave before a guaranteed settlement was reached. In these circumstances, Makarios was prepared to forgo Enosis and settle for independence.

The decisive factor, however, was Britain's decision that sovereignty over Cyprus was no longer crucial to her strategic requirements. With 28,000 British troops tied down chasing two or three hundred E.O.K.A. terrorists, Cyprus had become a military liability. In addition, Britain no longer needed to retain control of the island in order to reassure the Nuri Said regime in Iraq and other Arab allies of the permanence of British commitment to their support. In July, 1958, a revolution in Iraq overthrew the monarchy and the new regime repudiated the alliance with Britain in the Baghdad Pact.

By the end of 1958, then, British interest in retaining sovereignty over the

whole of Cyprus was gone and the island's future depended upon whether Greece and Turkey could reach agreement. The outline of such an agreement was worked out by Greek and Turkish ministers at meetings in Zurich in January and February, 1959. The talks then moved to London. On February 17 the Greek and Turkish ministers were joined at Lancaster House by British ministers and by Makarios and Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, leader of the Turkish Cypriots. The Cypriot leaders were presented by the three governments with a fait accompli, a settlement which they were virtually obliged to accept, and two days later the documents were signed.

The London Agreement provided for Cyprus to become an independent republic. Enosis and partition were specifically ruled out and a constitution was to be drawn up giving the Turkish Cypriot minority special rights. A treaty of guarantee bound Cyprus to remain independent and to respect its constitution, and Britain, Greece and Turkey pledged themselves to defend this new status quo,

and to intervene, jointly or separately, if it were upset. Two small areas of the island were to remain under British sovereignty – the Dhekelia army base, on the south coast, and the Akrotiri air base. Britain also retained the right to use sites and facilities elsewhere on the island for military purposes. Finally, there was established an alliance between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey under which 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops were to be stationed on the island to help train the Cypriot Army and to provide an additional guarantee of the settlement.

The drawing up of a constitution was not completed until a year later. It was a complex matter, since it had to contain a satisfactory definition of relations between the Greek community and the Turkish minority, which, at the 1960 census, comprised only 18 per cent of the population. Not surprisingly, it was the constitution which was to prove the weak spot of the whole agreement. The island was to be governed by a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president. Under them came a council of ministers, seven Greek and three Turkish.



with one of the key posts of foreign affairs, defence or finance reserved for one of the latter. The Turks were to be given the right to a disproportionate 30 per cent of all posts in the public service and to 40 per cent of those in the pro-

jected army of 2,000.

The House of Representatives was to have 50 members, 35 Greeks and 15 Turks, elected on separate rolls. There were also to be two separate "ethnic" chambers to deal with matters such as religion and education. The five main towns - Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca, Famagusta and Paphos - were to have separate elected councils for each community and a co-ordinating committee to operate joint services. Finally, neutral judges from outside Cyprus were to preside over the island's High Court and Supreme Constitutional Court.

Two items of the agreement caused particular misgivings among Greek Cypriots. The first was that any laws affecting elections, the municipalities, taxes or customs duties required separate Greek and Turkish majorities, thereby giving the Turkish representatives a veto. The second was the presence of Turkish

troops on the island. Makarios, however, accepted these provisions under protest, fearing partition and the withdrawal of support from Athens if he did not. Grivas was even more hostile to the settlement because of its ban on Enosis, but decided that "it would be difficult for me to achieve any more alone, faced with an all-powerful Empire," and declared that he was withdrawing from public life. He was given a safe conduct to Greece, where he received a hero's welcome and promotion to the rank of general, with full pay for life.

After some hard bargaining by Makarios, which whittled the British sovereign areas down to less than 100 square miles, the final agreements were concluded in July, 1960, and on August 16 Cyprus was proclaimed an independent republic under the presidency of Archbishop Makarios. The following day Sir Hugh Foot, the last British Governor, left the island. On the eve of his departure, Foot made a final broadcast to the islanders: "A few dismal commentators say that the people of Cyprus will destroy each other. They say that you will tear yourselves to bits -Greek against Turk and Left against Right. There are a few who say that the island will go down in a sea of blood and hate. It could be - but I don't believe it."

There were some grounds for Foot's optimism. In area, Cyprus was as big as the Lebanon and its population of half a million was three or four times that of Iceland's. In 1960 its per capita income was £139 a year, low by European standards, but, second only to Israel's in the eastern Mediterranean. The British agreed to provide financial aid totalling £12 million over five years. They also left behind an efficient administration, good roads and public facilities, and impressive achievements in water development, afforestation, and public health. Trade unions were firmly established and farmers' co-operatives were set up and working well.

Britain had also ended the centuriesold problem of crop devastation by wandering herds of goats. The handling of the problem is a prime example of imperial ingenuity. Deliberately appealing to the Greek love of politics, the authorities encouraged each village to hold a plebiscite on the issue of whether or not goats should be tethered. The great majority voted in favour of tethering, which meant, according to Foot, that "A scourge which had held back agricul-



tural development for centuries past was brought under control, and in wide areas eliminated altogether."

But whatever its economic prospects, Cyprus's future development depended upon the willingness of Greeks and Turks to make a success of the island's elaborate political structure. It was not long, however, before friction began to build up between the two communities. Makarios and his vice-president, Dr. Kutchuk, were, themselves, almost national stereotypes of the nimble-witted Greek and the stolid Turk. Makarios was handsome, slender and graced with a pale, alert face which radiated intelligence and humour. He was eloquent, but also able to listen quietly and courteously. Kutchuk, who ran a medical practice, was red-faced and heavy, not an easy talker, though impressive in his seriousness. Both were stubborn men.

Although Makarios was often described in the British Press as an intriguer and a devious "Byzantine" politician, he was, in fact, remarkably consistent in his aims and strategy. But he had to operate carefully to maintain control over his mixed following of nationalists, Communists and armed guerrillas. And if, in the 1960s, he appeared to show less skill in handling the Turkish Cypriots than he had in organizing the struggle for independence, this was largely because of Cyprus's traditional divisions.

The Turks felt that the Greeks did not accept them as a separate national community, but merely suffered them as intruders on a Greek island. The Greeks thought that the London Agreement was unworkable and was being used by the Turks to pave the way to partition. The Turks constantly complained of not being consulted and resented Greek indifference to Turkish poverty, which the Greeks blamed on natural laziness or the influence of Islam. There was conflict over the Civil Service, the Army, taxation and foreign policy. In March, 1961, Cyprus had become a member of the Commonwealth. She was also allied with Greece, Turkey and Britain, all N.A.T.O. members. But Makarios favoured nonalignment and kept Cyprus out of the N.A.T.O. bloc.

By far the most important conflict, and the one which was mainly to blame for an outbreak of full-scale warfare between the two communities, was over the municipal structure of the five main towns. The Greeks wanted a united council to function in each of them, while the Turks wanted the dual-council system consolidated. Disagreement on this question led the Turks to veto income tax laws in December, 1961, bringing about a constitutional deadlock which the Supreme Constitutional Court was unable to break.

Within a year Cyprus was hovering on the brink of chaos. On September 4, 1962, Makarios spoke in his own village of Panayia. According to a Turkish source, he issued an uncompromising warning: "Unless this small Turkish community, forming a part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of E.O.K.A. can never be considered as terminated." The quotation is uncharacteristic and its source is dubious, but the Turks believed it to be accurate. In December, 1963, Makarios sent Dr. Kutchuk a memorandum proposing the replacement of separate institutions by an integrated unitary state with limited guarantees for the Turkish community. The Turkish government now stepped in, rejected Makarios's proposals and insisted that there must be no change in the constitution.

n December 21 fighting broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. By Christmas scores had died and Cyprus was engulfed in a civil war and a grave international crisis. In response to an appeal from Turkish Cypriots, the government in Ankara warned that it might intervene unless the fighting stopped and began to assemble warships at Alexandretta and sent jet planes flying low over Nicosia. Greece then declared that she would intervene if Turkey did so. Britain helped to arrange a truce and British troops moved into a buffer zone to separate the forces of the two communities. But a conference in London in January, 1964, failed to produce

agreement and Britain was also unable to persuade her N.A.T.O. allies to share responsibility for peace-keeping in the troubled island.

The dispute then went before the U.N. Security Council, which authorized the appointment of a mediator and the dispatch to Cyprus of a peace-keeping force. This consisted of 7,000 troops drawn from Britain, Ireland, Canada, Finland, Denmark and Sweden. Nine years later, after intermittent negotiations, occasional outbreaks of fighting and more threats of Turkish intervention, almost 3,000 U.N. peace-keepers are still on the island. No permanent political settlement has yet been reached. Instead, a temporary de facto partition has been created, with the main Turkish enclave in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia and a strip of land 15 miles north to the outskirts of the port of Kyrenia. There are also lesser Turkish strongholds at Larnaca and Famagusta and pockets elsewhere in the island, all under Turkish Cypriot control.

With increasing prosperity, most Greek Cypriots seem content to accept the situation indefinitely, and although Grivas has reappeared on the scene at the head of a new underground E.O.K.A. organization pledged to achieving Enosis, he has been able to win little popular support. Makarios, who is now denounced by the General as a traitor, has stated his own position with compelling logic: "I have struggled for the union of Cyprus with Greece, and Enosis will always be my deep national aspiration as it is the aspiration of all Greek Cypriots. My national creed has never changed and my career as a national leader has shown no inconsistency or contradiction. I have accepted independence instead of Enosis because certain external conditions and factors have not allowed a free choice.'

Britain is no longer one of those external factors. She still has her bases in Cyprus and Makarios continues to take his place at the table of Commonwealth conferences. But the future of the island now depends upon relations between Greece and Turkey. For the British, "the key to western Asia" has become little more than a sunny tourist resort, noted for its beaches and friendly people.



## ODY CHIRISTIM

In the early hours of December 21, 1963, Greek Cypriot police stopped a Turkish Cypriot and a prostitute in the red light district of Nicosia, close to the city's Turkish quarter, and asked them for identification. A hostile Turkish crowd soon gathered and the policemen became jittery. Shots rang out. The couple were killed and several Turks wounded. Ever since Cyprus gained its quickly. By Christmas Eve civil war was raging.

independence in August, 1960, tension had been building up between the island's two communities: now it snapped. That same morning Greek irregulars fired on Turkish public buildings and Turks stoned or shot at passing Greek vehicles. The next day Turkish families began fleeing their homes (above) and fighting spread






The distraught faces of three women (left) bear testimony to the savagery that gripped Cyprus in December, 1963.




A frightened child watches her mother comforting an old woman driven from her home.





reek Cypriot soldiers form a guard of honour the military funeral given to victims of Turkish r attacks on the island in August, 1964.





Greek women in Nicosia denounce the U.N.'s
use of British troops in May, 1964. AntiBritish feeling was inflamed by Labour
leader Harold Wilson's remark that Greek
attacks on Turks were "supervised genocide."

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
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